Purpose: The paper first reviews Sukuk risk classification schemes based on extending and adapting the risk classification schemes of conventional finance. It is then argued that risk classification schemes based on Sukuk structure provide significant insights into Sukuk risk not obtainable from conventional schemes. This is because Sukuk structure risk classification schemes link Sukuk risk more directly to the fundamental causal factors creating those risks.
Introduction

The expected returns model research programme
The paper reviews and evaluates the risks associated with Sukuk, and in particular with risks arising from differences in Sukuk structure.
This research is set within a wider research programme, the eventual aim of which is to apply to Sukuk the expected returns models that have proved to be successful in the analysis of equities and conventional bonds (Haugen and Baker (1996) , Pagas (2008) ).
An expected returns model, an ER model, is a multifactor risk model of the form:
E(RA) = cA + 1,A F1 + 2,A F1 + … + n,A Fn + A (Equation 1) E(RA) is the expected return of security A, cA is a constant term, Fk is the k th risk factor, k,A is the exposure of security A to the k th risk factor, and A is an error term.
ER models have a mathematical form similar to the more well-known arbitrage pricing models, APT models. However, ER models and APT models differ fundamentally in terms of their motivations and interpretations. In APT models all of the risk factors, Fk, are economic risk factors, i.e. factors such as CAPM s and unexpected changes in oil prices, interest rates, and industrial production that affect the fundamental value of the real assets underlying the financial security A. Typically, from around three to seven risk factors are used in APT models.
ER models, on the other hand, include two kinds of risk factors. Firstly, the economic risk factors used in APT models are also used in ER models. However, ER models also include behavioural risk factors, i.e. risk factors arising from the systematically irrational behaviour identified and investigated in the literature in behavioural finance. For example, high earningsto-price, dividends-to-price, sales-to-price, and book-value to market-value ratios can be interpreted as proxies for security A's exposure to the investors' overreaction factor (Lakonishok, et al, 2002) . Typically, ER models include at least twenty economic and behavioural risk factors, and frequently many more.
In the academic finance literature APT models have been studied more extensively than ER models. In part this is due to the dominance in academic finance of the neoclassical model of economics, in which rational self-interest is the fundamental assumption. The rational selfinterest assumption implies that financial markets are semi-strong efficient, or at least nearsemi-strong efficient. Hence, from the neoclassical perspective behavioural risk factors are not regarded as being of much significance. However, semi-strong efficiency is an unrealistic assumption to make for the still developing markets in Shariah compliant financial securities.
Hence it is logical to base the risk-expected return analysis of Islamic financial markets on ER models, which are more general, and make fewer presuppositions than the more well-studied APT models. In addition, extensive research in behavioural finance indicates that behavioural risk factors are significant in explaining securities returns, and that ER models out-perform APT models in terms of their explanatory and predictive power.
There are three steps in the development of ER models.
STEP 1:
The first step is the identification and evaluation of the risk factors, the Fk, to be used in constructing the ER model. In many ways this first step is the most important. Once the risk factors have been chosen, the construction and critical testing of the ER model is a purely technical and routine matter, involving the application of standard statistical and optimisation techniques.
This paper is concerned with STEP 1, and in particular with the identification and evaluation of risks caused by the Shariah structures of Sukuk.
STEP 2:
Once the risk factors have been chosen, the ER model is constructed in STEP 2. The key stages in STEP 2 are using multiple regression analysis to estimate securities' exposure to the risk factors, i.e. to estimate the k,A, and testing for stability of the k,A over time.
STEP 3: Finally, in STEP 3 optimisation techniques are used to construct portfolios that are optimal with respect to their risk-expected return characteristics. STEP 2 tests how the risk factors are priced in the market. STEP 3 tests the extent to which the market mis-prices these risks.
Methodology
The expected returns model research programme outlined above follows the deductive methodology. The grand hypothesis is:
Hg: Expected returns models will be successful in explaining and predicting the returns and the volatilities of returns of Shariah compliant equities and Sukuk.
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As noted above, STEP 1, the identification of the risk factors to be used in the expected returns model, is the most important, and the most difficult step. it is applied to out-of-sample data. The second drawback is more subtle. The kitchen sink regression will result in some of the  coefficients being significant, and some insignificant. It can then be hypothesised that the factors with significant  coefficients are the 'real' risk factors, while the statistically insignificant factors can be discarded. The model can then be cut-down to a smaller model in which only the significant factors are included. The subtle point is that all of the data has been used up in generating the cut-down model, i.e. all of the data has been used in developing a hypothesis about which risk factors are important in explaining security returns. The data cannot then be used to test the cut-down model, since it has already been used to find the cut-down model.
This second drawback is of extreme importance for studies in Islamic finance. Islamic financial markets are a relatively recent development. Unlike in conventional finance, researchers in Islamic finance do not have long time series of data at their disposal. Hence, the data that is available must be used as efficiently as possible. Data should be used to test hypotheses, and should not be used up in merely developing hypotheses.
The approach of this paper is to apply the meta-study method in order to generate the hypotheses about which risk factors are expected to be significant in an ER model. Once the factors have been identified the ER model can then be constructed and tested by following the procedures outlined in STEP 2 and STEP 3 in Section 1.1 above 2 . Thus, the limited data available will not be used up in formulating the hypotheses.
2 At the time of writing STEPs 2 and 3 have recently become feasible due to an agreement between the authors' institution, the University of **********, and Idealratings, Inc. to undertake together a programme of joint research in Islamic finance. Idealratings is a leading provider of Islamic financial data, including a Shariah compliant screening and income purification service covering over 40,000 listed equities and virtually the entire Sukuk universe. While the data time series are considerably shorter and less complete than those available in conventional finance, the data resources are sufficient for substantial progress to be made in the research questions addressed.
Islamic finance, in contrast to conventional finance where empirical studies are dominant. This is due to the limited data that is currently available to researchers in Islamic finance, and which is required for conducting empirical tests. The advantage of meta-study analysis, however, is that the limited data available has not been consumed in formulating testable hypotheses.
Important sources from which the secondary data is obtained include government studies, reports and archives, textbooks, and professional and academic journals (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007 
Risk in Islamic finance theory
In the Islamic financial system risk is an essential element of profit making. Risk forms the basis of profit in that both profits and losses are shared in a joint enterprise. Just as profit is the lifeblood of the Islamic economic system, so too is the assumption of risk. Any commercial partnership in which the profits are shared between partners and not the risk is not a valid Islamic commercial transaction. Both profits and risks must be shared.
Islam does not object to trade, nor does it simply prohibit contracts just for the sake of it.
However, Islam is against guarantees in trade, as the Prophet Mohammed peace be upon him said: ''al-kharaj bil-Dhaman'', which bases the entitlement to revenue on a corresponding liability for bearing losses. In Shariah it is prohibited for an individual or institution to earn a profit without shouldering a liability. For example, the capital provider in Mudaraba, or
Mudaraba-like transactions, is entitled to profit because all operational losses (those not caused by negligence or misconduct on the part of Mudarib) will be debited from his capital (mal). On the other hand a lender in Qard, or risk-free loan, cannot take any compensation or reward from a borrower, as his loaned money is not subject to operational risks (the borrower is obliged to return the loan principal in full at the specified payback time).
Iqbal ( e) Real investment is permitted, while speculation is forbidden. f) Fixed, or guaranteed, rates of return are not permitted.
While risk cannot be avoided in Islamic finance, Islam permits, and recommends, taking prudent precautions to mitigate risks. In particular, it is permitted to make the mitigation of risks one of the key aims in the design of Islamic financial instruments. In this regard issuers and investors view Sukuk 3 with great interest. For issuers, including government agencies, multinational corporations, and development institutions, Sukuk help with meeting funding requirements for large infrastructure projects and business expansion. From the investor's perspective Sukuk can reduce investment risks. The value of Sukuk is largely stable, as it is asset backed or at least asset based, the investment time horizon of Sukuk is fixed, further reducing the risk profile, and Sukuk also help investors to reduce risk through portfolio diversification. Given these benefits to both issuers and investors, the high historical rates of growth of the Sukuk market are expected to continue for the foreseeable future.
As far as risk identifications in Islamic finance are concerned, risk is a main pillar in Islamic finance life cycle because the conceptual of Islamic finance transactions based on trade compared to conventional finance is based on debt. In fact, risk is associated with all Islamic finance instruments including Sukuk. In turn, risk mechanism is based on the deeply understanding of risk factors and its roots in order to apply risk management and measurement approach.
Despite this bright picture, Sukuk, and the Islamic finance industry in general, face several unique risks. Since Islamic financial institutions do not provide a guaranteed return in exchange for customers' deposits or investments, investors may move their money to other financial institutions should the returns not match their expectations. Thus, Islamic financial institutions face liquidity risk, with the possibility of customers withdrawing funds too quickly. To add to this challenge the financial institution may also be required to pay returns to fund providers even if the underlying assets do not earn profits. These risks may, to some extent, be managed through the establishment of a liquid inter-bank market.
In the Islamic finance system, the only means available to capitalise on a business is through the various modes of partnership, in which the financier provides equity capital and shares in the risks and rewards of the venture. The capital structure of an Islamic enterprise may itself act as its own risk management mechanism, since the partnership structure encourages the partners themselves to make the required efforts to identify, measure, and manage the risks. It is notable that the catastrophic failures of risk management of the Wall Street investment banks, culminating in the financial crisis of 2008, resulted at least in part from the abandonment of the partnership structure in favour of the corporate structure, which broke the mechanism for sharing risks and rewards that existed in the investment banking partnerships. The social and community ties so central to the Islamic way of life are also a means of risk management for individuals, households and businesses. The risk management mechanism in Islamic finance is based upon strong social relationships as a means of accessing help. The risk management of physical assets in Islamic finance, particularly for businesses, revolves around a combination of savings and physical risk management. Retirement benefits too are a combination of communal risk sharing and savings.
In contrast to conventional investors, Islamic investors must also consider the ethical aspects of their investment, and the types of economic activities in which they invest (Erol, Kaynak and Radi, 1990 3. Overall, an Islamic investor must avoid Riba in any form (given, charging and receiving).
In addition, Islamic investors must also avoid forbidden economic activities which include producing or dealing in alcohol or drugs, unless needed for medical purposes (Segrado, 2005) .
These ethical requirements impose further dimensions of risk in Islamic finance that are generally not present in conventional finance.
Therefore, this open a door =towards underpin risk identification in Islamic finance theory and how this identification mechanism reflects on Sukuk as its recent exiting Islamic finance instrument in the global finance market.
Risks associated with Sukuk
The previous section has indicated some, but not all ways, in which Sukuk may be less risky than their conventional counterparts. However, it is also the case that Sukuk are exposed to many dimensions of risk that do not arise with conventional bonds. According to the Alsayed (2013), however, emphasises that Sukuk currently operate within an interest based financial system, and consequently that risk management in Sukuk is very complicated and difficult within the boundaries specified by the Shariah. She argues that scholars should therefore allow for some flexibility in structuring Sukuk.
Shariah compliance risk is of fundamental importance in Islamic finance. Concern over the possible Shariah non-compliance of Islamic financial securities is widespread, and the issues are currently far from being resolved. This built a road map of risk management paths customisable with Islamic finance principles.
Regulatory and supervisory frameworks
In fact, the effective supervision of Islamic banks requires that the three pillars framework of Basel III and the language of risks it introduces be adapted appropriately to its operational characteristics. Such adoption of Basel III would require a medium term effort involving; i)
Strengthening the existing supervisory framework to achieve full compliance with Basel Core
Principles of Banking Supervision.
(ii) Developing appropriate risk measurement and disclosure procedures supported by systematic efforts to build up databases needed for risk measurement; (iii) In parallel, building up the core elements of financial infrastructure and risk management instruments to support sound development of Islamic finance (Sundararajan, 2007 ). This will set the stage for adopting more advanced capital measurement approaches as envisaged in Basel III, but tailored to the specific operational characteristics of Islamic finance, including the role of investment instruments such as Sukuk.
The conventional risk classification approach
Risks associated with Islamic finance instruments, including Sukuk, can be categorised by Islamic finance shows risks grouped into five broad categories: transaction, business, treasury, governance and systemic risks (El-Hawary et al., 2004) . While these categories are also applicable to non-Islamic finance, specific risks within them are more relevant to Islamic finance, and the nature of contracts it uses. However, the nature of differences between Islamic finance instruments requires a precise listed risk profile to each Islamic finance instrument in order to gain a more accurate reading of those risk measurements on these instruments.
The stakeholder risk classification approach
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the nature of different features of investment instruments according to inherited features of Shariah principles. In the Sukuk context, IFSB 
Risk underlying Sukuk structures
The aim of this study is to shine new light on Sukuk risk analysis through an examination of financial risk among Sukuk structures. Hence, a determination and interpretation of the above Figures 2 and 3 , and the difference between Sukuk risk profiles and bond risk profiles are made.
Referring to previous studies conducted on risks of Sukuk structures such as Fabozzi (2000) 
Evaluation of risk profiles underlying Sukuk Structures Figure 4: Risk roots in Sukuk structures
Source: Created by Webb, P. (1996) , Reilly & Brown (2012) 
and developed by Authors (2015)
Risk management of Sukuk structures is a relatively a new subject (Alsayed, 2013) . Against the earlier discussion, it has been noticeable from Table 1 and Figure 4 that each Sukuk structure has a distinctive risk profile influenced by the Shariah conditions behind the concept of the financing structure as well as the type of certificate. Therefore, the risks that Sukuk encounter vary according to the structure of the Sukuk. For example, the risks of Sukuk
Murabahah, which has a fixed return, differ from those of Sukuk Musharakah; the risks of Sukuk Istisna differ from those of Sukuk Ijarah; and so on. It is important to state that these risks also vary depending on the underlying assets of these Sukuk, be they fixed or movable assets, utilities or services.
Furthermore, risk in securitisation of Sukuk structures is a complex path to follow in due it is in conjunction with serval influence mainly Shariah rules driver. As it seen in figure 4 the Webb (1996) risk story of Sukuk is built on the conceptual of conventional bonds. The figure explains risk factors that exposure Sukuk over securitisation life cycle.
As Sukuk risk as research concern, screening Sukuk platforms and follows is important to draw holistic picture of Sukuk risk factor and its follows over securitisation of Sukuk as this clearly attempt to display in the above matrix and figure. 
Empirical studies on Sukuk structure risks
A few studies have been conducted on Sukuk structure analysis. One of these studies conducted by Abdul Jalil and Abdul Raham (2012) was about a comparison analysis between two Sukuk structures in terms of long term tenure. They determine that the amount of profit gained from the musharakah mutanagisah structure using a coupon rate of 4.5 %, priced at par with a tenure of five years was greater than the Ijarah structure where the price is at a discount.
In addition, they computed and compared the profits obtained from Sukuk investment in Ijarah and musharakah mutanagisah for a 3.5% coupon rate and price at par for a Sukuk with tenure of 12.5, 15, 17.5 and 19 years. They applied these two models for computing the profit. These 
Managing Sukuk structure risks
Sukuk provide opportunities for financial innovation, not all of which are available for conventional bonds. While Sukuk are exposed to certain risks beyond those born by conventional bonds, Sukuk financing also provides for new ways of managing these risks, and for tailoring Sukuk instruments to the particular needs of issuers and investors. Some contributions to financial innovation in Sukuk markets are discussed below.
Considering the nature of Sukuk structures from the Shariah perspective, it is seen that the evolution of structures such as Sukuk Ijarah has been instrumental in increasing Sukuk issue size for issuers. Structures such as agency Sukuk (Wakalah) have allowed issuers to maximize the use of limited tangibles in an issuance, and thus allowed them to issue a larger quantum than if they had used an Ijarah structure. In practise, issuers like Ooredoo have used other real tangible assets such as airtime minutes via a Manfah (usufructs) structure under the Ijarah concept (Zawya, 2014) . Another on-going discussion among scholars is about permissibility of third party guarantees in some Sukuk issues (Hassan and Soumaré, 2007) . Proponents of such guarantees, usually issued by the governments, claim that there is no clear prohibition of such action in any Islamic source. Thus, according to this discussion, as long as the guarantor is financially and legally independent from both contracting parties involved in the Sukuk transaction, the third party can guarantee the entire investment or part of it without obtaining any fees for this operation. Opponents of such a guarantee argue that it can open the possibility for Riba and highlight the Shariah prohibition of any kind of guarantee of the capital (Al-Amine, 2008).
While this paper has focussed on Sukuk structure risks, the conventional risk classifications discussed in Section 3 are also of value in identifying, measuring and managing Sukuk risks.
Thus, risk management for Sukuk can borrow from the general risk management theory in conventional finance, for example, as discussed by Reilly and Brown (2012) . In this regard, Al Sayed (2013) concluded in her paper that conventional risk management, variance for total risk and the Beta coefficient for systematic risk, can be used to measure total risk and systematic risk of Sukuk. In addition, the conventional risk management strategies of diversification and hedging are applicable to the management of Sukuk risk. The multifactor expected returns models discussed in Section 1 combine the insights and techniques of conventional finance with those derived from the risk analysis of Sukuk structures. Indeed, it is hypothesised that structure risk factors will be highly significant in the proposed expected return regressions of STEP 2 of Section 1.
Conclusion
A number of schemes for the classification of Sukuk risks based on extending and adapting the risk classification schemes used in conventional finance have been proposed in the literature. A recent development has been the development of risk classifications based on Sukuk structures. It is argued that Sukuk structure risk classifications provide a better way of linking Sukuk risks with the fundamental factors causing those risks. Further, the different Sukuk structures follow directly from the fundamental ethical principles underlying Islamic finance. Thus, Sukuk structure risk classifications are theoretically superior to conventional classification schemes, since structure risks are created by the necessity for Sukuk to conform to the Shariah. Sukuk structure risks are essentially Shariah created risks. The evaluation of the structure risks of the Sukuk structure risk classification scheme proposed in this paper are summarised in Table 1. Structure risks do not exhaust all the dimensions of risk to which Sukuk are exposed. Very general models for explaining and predicting Sukuk returns are the multifactor expected returns models discussed in Section 1. It is hypothesised that structure risks will be highly significant, Page 24 of 29 both statistically and economically, when included in the risk factors of an expected returns model. The empirical testing of this hypothesis is continued in the sequel.
Given the short data time series currently available to researchers in Islamic finance, empirical tests of expected returns models cannot yet be conducted to the same degree of rigour as in conventional finance. For example, it is not possible to properly test for the stability of coefficients in STEP 2 of Section 1, given the current data. Nevertheless, no data has been used up in hypothesis formation, due to the meta-study approach used in this paper to develop the hypotheses. This means that the proposed empirical testing can now be carried out to an acceptable level of statistical rigour.
